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Abstract. Recent scholarship on regulatory oversight has focused on cost-benefit analysis of 
prescriptive regulations – regulations that restrict behavior such as pollution – and their use to 
cure market failures, and has overlooked the vast number of transfer regulations. Transfer 
regulations are regulations that channel funds to beneficiaries. These regulations are authorized 
by statutes that establish entitlement programs like Medicare and Social Security, pay one-time 
distributions to victims of misfortunes such as natural disasters and the 9/11 terrorist attack, and 
fund pork barrel spending. Cost-benefit analysis cannot be used to evaluate transfer regulations 
because all transfer regulations fail cost-benefit analysis, but cost-effectiveness analysis can be 
used to evaluate transfer regulation. Although executive orders appear to require agencies to use 
cost-effectiveness analysis to evaluate transfer regulations that have a large economic impact, 
the agencies’ record is dismal. Most agencies fail to perform cost-effectiveness analysis, and 
other agencies perform cost-effectiveness analysis incorrectly. More vigorous OMB and, 
possibly, judicial review could improve the quality of distributive regulations. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Every year the Office of Management and Budget sends a report to Congress that 
discusses federal regulations reviewed by OMB during the prior year.2 These reports 
include a calculation of the aggregate costs and benefits of most major or significant 
regulations, so that Congress and the public may be given a sense of the welfare impact 
of regulatory policy. But excluded from this calculation is a class of regulations that 
OMB calls “agency transfer rules.” The Draft 2003 OMB report lists 23 such rules, 
issued by a diverse group of agencies, including Agriculture, Defense, Health and Human 
Services, and Transportation.3 The 2002 OMB Report lists 72 rules over an eighteen 
month period.4 Most of these rules implemented a congressional authorization or mandate 
to spend money. An appropriation statute would provide that a certain amount of money 
be given to farmers, or dairy producers, or victims of the 9/11 attack, and would direct an 
                                                 
1 Kirkland & Ellis Professor of Law, University of Chicago. Thanks to Matthew Adler, John Duffy, Beth 
Garrett, Tom Merrill, Cass Sunstein, and Adrian Vermeule for their comments, and to J.T. Bloch for 
research assistance. The Sarah Scaife Foundation Fund and The Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation Fund 
provided financial support. 
2 The most recent published report is Office Management of Budget, Stimulating Smarter Regulation 
(2002) [2002 OMB Report]. The draft report for 2003 can be found at Office of Management and Budget, 
Draft 2003 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations; Notice, 68 Fed. Reg. 
5,492 (February 3, 2003) [Draft 2003 OMB Report]. The reports also discuss regulations issued by 
independent agencies, make proposals for regulatory reform, and discuss related matters. The OMB Report 
2002 covers eighteen months. All of the reports can be downloaded from  
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/regpol-reports_congress.html. 
3 Draft 2003 OMB Report, 68 Fed. Reg., at 5,497, tble. 5. 
4 2002 OMB Report, at 59, tble. 10. 
agency, in very general language, to give the money to the intended beneficiaries. Other 
transfer rules were issued pursuant to entitlement programs such as Medicare or Social 
Security. Agencies charged with the task of distributing money under these programs 
issued regulations that specified who would receive money, how much the person would 
receive, and how one should apply for it. 
 OMB has not explained why it excludes transfer regulations from the calculation 
of the aggregate net benefits of federal regulation but the reason is clear. Ordinary 
regulations are supposed to correct market failures, and a regulation that successfully 
corrects a market failure generates social value. Cost-benefit analysis distinguishes 
regulations that generate social value and those that do not, and an aggregate cost-benefit 
analysis of all federal regulations reveals whether the regulations as a group increase or 
decrease efficiency. Transfer regulations, unlike ordinary market-correcting regulations, 
are not designed to generate value in the economic sense. A transfer regulation that pays 
$100 to farmers also costs taxpayers $100; the costs and benefits wash out, producing a 
social loss if administrative costs are greater than 0, as they always are. Thus, a 
conventional cost-benefit analysis of a transfer regulation will always yield a negative 
outcome. Treating every transfer regulation as a social cost, and subtracting the costs of 
transfer regulations from the net benefits of ordinary regulations, would not tell us 
anything about the quality of agency rulemaking; it would tell us that Congress has 
decided to use agencies to implement transfers, something we already knew. The purpose 
of the OMB reports is not to tell Congress that agencies implement transfers; it is to tell 
Congress about the quality of agency rulemaking. 
 But this does not mean that transfer regulations cannot be evaluated. The 
difference between an ordinary regulation and a transfer regulation is, on a rough 
approximation (to be refined below), that the transfer regulation achieves a distributional 
goal or outcome mandated by Congress. Ordinary cost-benefit analysis cannot be used 
for evaluating a transfer regulation but cost-benefit principles can be used. The term of 
art for a cost-benefit analysis that takes distributional goals as fixed and evaluates the 
means for achieving them is cost-effectiveness analysis, a decision procedure that is used 
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widely by policy analysts outside the government.5 Cost-effectiveness analysis is the 
correct decision procedure for evaluating transfer regulations. 
 Executive Order 12,886 requires agencies to use cost-benefit analysis or cost-
effectiveness analysis, whichever is appropriate.6 It is the successor of Executive Order 
12,291, which was signed by President Reagan in 1981.7 These executive orders, and 
some other related executive orders and statutes, have caused a significant shift in the 
practices of regulatory agencies, and over the last two decades it has become standard 
practice for agencies to perform and report cost-benefit analyses for important regulations 
other than transfer regulations. OMB reviews agencies’ cost-benefit analyses and issues 
guidelines for good practice, as well as drafting the reports to Congress discussed above. 
With the prodding of OMB, the agencies’ cost-benefit analyses have gradually improved. 
These regulatory changes have in turn generated an enormous academic literature on 
cost-benefit analysis and its influence on regulatory outcomes.8 
 There has been no comparable activity with respect to transfer regulations. 
Agencies that implement transfer regulations recognize that Executive Order 12,886 
applies, but they rarely provide the cost-effectiveness analysis that the executive order 
requires. Although agencies do, usually, say something about the costs of a regulation, 
their comments are rarely illuminating and often incoherent. Some agencies simply state 
that the regulation complies with the executive order without further elaboration.9 Some 
agencies provide only the amount of the disbursement.10 Some agencies do perform, or 
claim to perform, a cost-effectiveness analysis, but in fact make claims inconsistent with 
                                                 
5 It is used frequently for evaluating regulations of medical practices; see Part II.A., for an example. 
6 “When an agency determines that a regulation is the best available method of achieving the regulatory 
objective, it shall design its regulations in the most cost-effective manner to achieve the regulatory 
objective.” Exec. Order No. 12,866 §(1)(b)(5), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 §(1)(b)(5) (October 4, 1993). 
7 Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (February 19, 1981). 
8 See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform (1982); Cass Sunstein, Risk and Reason (2002). 
Neither of these books mentions transfer regulations or says much about cost-effectiveness analysis. Nor 
can one find discussions in the major case books. 
9 E.g., Federal Emergency Management Agency, Office of Cerro Grande Fire Claims, 66 Fed. Reg. 15,948, 
15,958 (March 21, 2001). 
10 E.g., Department of Agriculture, Commodity Credit Corporation, Wool and Mohair Market Loss 
Assistance Program and Apple Market Loss Assistance Program, 66 Fed. Reg. 13,839 (March 8, 2001) 
(describing the amounts to be paid to various producers); Small Business Administration, New Markets 
Venture Capital Program, 66 Fed. Reg. 28,602 (May 23, 2001) (describing SBA’s administrative and 
applicants administrative costs for a loan guarantee program). 
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cost-effectiveness principles.11 OMB does not appear to engage in a strict review, as it 
does for cost-benefit analysis of ordinary, non-transfer regulations;12 and, as noted above, 
its annual reports to Congress do not discuss the quality of the cost-effectiveness analyses 
performed by agencies during the prior year. The academic literature on transfer 
regulations is nil. 
 What explains the contrast between the intensity of interest in cost-benefit 
analysis of regulations designed to solve market failures, and cost-effectiveness analysis 
of transfer regulations? OMB says nothing about this topic in its reports to Congress: it 
lists the transfer regulations without explaining why their costs and benefits are not 
discussed. A separate document, the Best Practices guidelines, implies without saying 
explicitly that transfer regulations are not susceptible to cost-benefit analysis because 
cost-benefit analysis is not designed to evaluate transfers.13 But the obvious rejoinder, 
that cost-effectiveness analysis can be used to evaluate transfer regulations, is not 
discussed. In short, there has been virtually no discussion – not by OMB or the agencies, 
not by academics – about the use of cost-effectiveness analysis to evaluate transfer 
regulations that disburse money or other benefits to specified groups. 
 This paper is a first effort to fill this gap. Part I defines transfer regulations and 
discusses their purposes and effects. Part II discusses cost-effectiveness analysis and 
explains how it can be used both to evaluate transfer regulations and to evaluate the 
statutes that authorize transfer regulations. Part III provides some examples of how 
agencies evaluate transfer regulations. Agencies sometimes claim to perform cost-
effectiveness analysis on transfer regulations but rarely perform it correctly. Throughout, 
it should be understood that there is no presumption that transfer regulations are 
undesirable; they can be used to good and bad ends, just like any other kind of regulation. 
                                                 
11 See Part III, for examples. 
12 There is some evidence that OMB has recently decided to pressure agencies to perform cost-
effectiveness analysis on transfer regulations. See OMB letters to SBA,  
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/sba_eidl/rtnltr.html; and to USDA, 
 www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/usda_ee_for_nonhuman_primates_rtnltr012902.html. The Draft 2003 
OMB Report, Appendix A, contains greater attention to cost-effectiveness analysis than in the past, but the 
context suggests that OMB has cost-effectiveness analysis of market-correcting regulations in mind, not of 
transfer regulations. See 68 Fed. Reg. 5492, 5499-5503. In addition, the administrator of Medicare has 
recently decided to use cost-effectiveness analysis to evaluate Medicare coverage. See Robert Pear, U.S. 
Limiting Costs of Drugs for Medicare, The New York Times, April 21, 2003, at A1. 
13 Office of Management and Budget, Economic Analysis of Federal Regulations Under Executive Order 
12866 (1996). 
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 I. WHAT ARE TRANSFER REGULATIONS? 
 
 Regulations, as Table 1 shows, can be divided into two types: prescriptive 
regulations and transfer regulations. Prescriptive regulations are rules that place 
restrictions on behavior. Examples include rules that restrict factory emissions, mandate 
safe workplaces, and require testing before drugs are marketed. Transfer regulations are 
rules that distribute money and other resources to firms or individuals. A regulation that 
distributes cash to victims of a natural disaster is a transfer regulation. However, transfer 
regulations do not always involve the disbursement of cash. Some transfer regulations 
distribute in-kind benefits such as food stamps or housing or licenses to use the radio 
spectrum. The appendix lists significant transfer regulations reviewed by OMB between 
April 1 and September 30, 2001.14 
 
Table 1: Types of Regulations 
Type Definition Example 
Prescriptive A regulation that restricts behavior Limitation on emission of a pollutant 
Transfer A regulation that transfers money or goods to beneficiaries 
Distribution of funds to victims of 
a natural disaster 
 
 The regulations on OMB’s list are diverse. They govern application procedures 
and eligibility criteria for cash relief for farmers whose crops have been destroyed by bad 
weather or driven from the market by foreign competition; the ingredients of the national 
school lunch and breakfast program; Medicare reimbursement for the cost of self-
management training for diabetics; prescription drug benefits for military personnel; 
disability criteria for children in the Social Security system; affirmative action reporting 
requirements for government contractors; disaster relief; and requirements for receiving 
certain small business loans. The thread running through the regulations on OMB’s list is 
that they are authorized by a congressional appropriation or budgetary statute, or a statute 
that establishes an entitlement program. 
                                                 
14 The list includes both “[s]ignificant regulatory action[s]” under Exec. Order No. 12,866 §3(f)(1), which 
are regulations that have an impact of at least $100 million, “major” rules under the Congressional Review 
Act, 5 U.S.C. §804(2) (2003), and rules above the threshold of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, 2 
U.S.C. §§1531-38 (2003). 
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  The purposes of regulation can be divided into two categories: correcting market 
failures and redistributing wealth. For example, a pollution regulation corrects a market 
failure, and a regulation that reimburses farmers who lost crops redistributes wealth. One 
might be tempted to generalize from these examples and conclude that all prescriptive 
regulations are designed to correct market failures and all transfer regulations are 
designed to redistribute resources to favored groups. But although this assumption is 
roughly true as an empirical matter, it is not an analytic truth. A transfer regulation can be 
designed to improve efficiency and a prescriptive regulation can be designed to transfer 
resources to a group. 
Consider, for example, a regulation that implements a congressional appropriation 
for monetary relief to victims of a natural disaster. This regulation looks like a 
straightforward transfer of money from the government to individuals, but it might be 
justified by a failure in the insurance market. If the insurance market fails to provide 
disaster insurance, the government might be justified in providing that insurance. One 
way to provide such insurance is to wait for a disaster to occur and then make payments 
to victims. If, as seems likely, people anticipate these transfers ex ante, then the 
regulation (in theory) enhances efficiency by enabling people to pool risk. 
As for prescriptive regulations that serve distributional purposes, consider 
regulations that implement a congressional plan to support farm prices through a quota 
system. The regulations do not transfer money to farmers, but limit the amount of 
production. But through the limitation on production, prices are increased and farmers are 
benefited. Although the regulation prescribes behavior, it serves a distributional aim, not 
efficiency. 
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 To bring order to this confusion, we need to make a number of distinctions, as 
shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Purposes of Regulations 
Purpose of Regulation 
Efficiency  
Type of 
Regulation Benefit Specified by Statute 
Benefit Not 
Specified by 
Statute 
Distribution 
Prescriptive Cost-Effectiveness Cost-Benefit Cost-Effectiveness 
Transfer Cost-Effectiveness ∅ Cost-Effectiveness 
 
There are two types of regulations – prescriptive and transfer – and two broad types of 
statutory goals, to increase efficiency and to make distributions. Within the category of 
efficiency-oriented statutes, some statutes state that the regulations should achieve 
relatively abstract benefits – public health, for example – and other statutes specify a 
concrete benefit such as reduction in the emission of a particular pollutant. 
Cost-benefit analysis can be used only to evaluate prescriptive regulations 
authorized by statutes that do not specify the distribution in detail. A pollution statute that 
directs an agency to enhance public health gives the agency the discretion to choose 
among alternative regulations on the basis of their efficiency;15 a pollution statute that 
directs an agency to limit pollution to a certain level does not give the agency the option 
to refrain from regulating when the statutory level is itself inefficient. Thus, cost-benefit 
analysis cannot be used in the latter case, though cost-effectiveness analysis can be used 
to distinguish among more or less costly ways to achieve the statutory level of pollution. 
 Cost-benefit analysis cannot be used to evaluate transfer regulations that are 
issued pursuant to a statute that is designed to enhance efficiency. Consider a statute that 
funds general scientific research on the theory that the market undersupplies such 
research. An agency is directed to issue transfer regulations that provide the rules for 
applying for grants. The statute might or might not have the effect of enhancing 
efficiency through regulation, but the agency cannot veto the statute, so there is no point 
in doing a cost-benefit analysis of the entire statutory scheme. The agency can only do 
cost-effectiveness analysis, which will reveal whether a given regulation is less costly 
                                                 
15 Unless the statute mandates a minimum level of regulation when any amount of regulation is inefficient. 
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than alternative regulations for accomplishing the statutory goal of converting money into 
knowledge. 
 When we turn to statutes that have distributional aims, we see that neither 
prescriptive regulations nor transfer regulations can be evaluated using cost-benefit 
analysis. Again, when the statutes specifies a distribution, cost-benefit analysis cannot be 
used. But cost-effectiveness analysis is appropriate, as we will see. 
 It is worth mentioning that statutory distributional schemes generally have two 
distinct purposes. The first purpose is to benefit a politically influential group, such as 
dairy producers or tobacco farmers. No serious scholar defends these transfers, and their 
unattractiveness might explain why the academic literature has ignored them. The 
implicit assumption seems to be that if these transfers are bad, then the regulations that 
implement them are bad, and there is no reason to discuss how to make them cost-
effective. This response, however, is wrong. If politically motivated transfers are 
regrettable, they are a fact of life, and it is an important task to analyze how to implement 
them in a way that minimizes their disruptive impact on the economy. 
 The second purpose of transfer regulations is to benefit poor people, people who 
suffer from discrimination, and people who have suffered a misfortune. Social Security, 
Medicare, and Medicaid authorize transfer regulations that provide benefits to the poor 
and not-so-poor. Regulations detailing affirmative action programs for government 
contractors benefit victims of discrimination. And the regulations governing the 
disbursements of 9/11 moneys and moneys for natural disasters benefit victims of a 
misfortune.16 Regulations are needed because Congress does not want to determine every 
detail about how funds are allocated and disbursed, and transfers these functions to an 
agency. Limited transfers to poor and unfortunate people are relatively uncontroversial, 
and it is thus a puzzle that the question of how to evaluate agency regulations that 
implement these transfers has been neglected by legal scholars. 
 Distributional statutes, then, are sometimes normatively defensible and sometimes 
not. But it is important to see that prescriptive regulations and transfer regulations 
authorized by distributional statutes all fail a standard cost-benefit analysis, that is, one 
                                                 
16 Of course, market-correcting rationales are sometimes given for these programs, but their thrust seems to 
be redistribution. 
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that does not use a multiplier to adjust for the lower purchasing power of the poor.17 
When a regulation disburses cash, the benefits can be no greater than the costs, and will 
be lower as long as there is some administrative cost. Consider a payment of $100 to a 
dairy producer. The benefit of the regulation is $100, and the cost of the regulation is 
$100 plus administrative expenses (and tax distortions if such is the case). This remains 
true for transfers to the poor. The benefit of a $100 transfer to a poor person is $100, and 
the cost is $100 plus administrative expenses. It is true that a poor person is likely to 
value $100 more than a rich person (or dairy producer) is: but such differences are 
excluded from cost-benefit analysis as it is usually performed.18 Cost-benefit analysis 
does not take account of the fact that the poor person values $100 more than the rich 
person does. Thus, cost-benefit analysis tells us that transfers to interest groups and poor 
people produce negative net benefits, and do not allow us to distinguish between these 
types of transfers, and it does not allow us to distinguish between better and worse 
regulations given a particular distributional goal. 
 In sum, cost-benefit analysis cannot be used to evaluate transfer or prescriptive 
regulations that have distributional aims, nor to evaluate transfer regulations that 
implement statutes with efficiency goals that do not leave the benefit or distribution 
decision to agencies. For all these purposes, cost-effectiveness analysis is necessary. The 
next Part focuses on the simplest case – the use of cost-effectiveness analysis to evaluate 
transfer regulations authorized by statutes with distributional goals – though most of what 
is said will apply to the other cases as well. 
 
II. ANALYSIS OF TRANSFER REGULATIONS AND STATUTES 
A. Analysis of Regulations 
 A cost-effective transfer regulation distributes resources less wastefully than 
alternative transfer regulations do. To take a simple example, consider a statute that 
authorizes an agency to distribute $10 million to victims of a natural disaster. The agency 
                                                 
17 At one time economists believed that multipliers could be used to reflect variation in the valuation of 
marginal dollars by people of different wealth, but this project foundered on technical, empirical, and 
philosophical difficulties. For a brief discussion, see Harvey S. Rosen, Public Finance 259-60 (3d ed. 
1992). 
18 There are some limited exceptions; see Matthew Adler & Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit 
Analysis When Preferences Are Distorted, 29 J. Legal Stud. 1105 (2000); Matthew Adler & Eric A. Posner, 
Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 Yale L.J. 165 (1999). 
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considers two transfer regulations. The first provides a lump sum payment of $1000 to 
each of the 10,000 people living in the affected area. The second requires individuals to 
apply for reimbursement of their losses, and to provide evidence of the losses. The first 
regulation will overcompensate some people and undercompensate others, but save 
administrative costs. The second regulation will provide more accurate compensation but 
generate sizable administrative costs. A cost-effectiveness analysis permits comparison of 
the two regulations. The more cost-effective regulation is the one that provides the fullest 
compensation to the most people – the first regulation if the natural disaster caused 
everyone about the same amount of harm greater than or equal to $1000; the second 
regulation if the disaster affected people unequally and proof is not too costly because 
records are complete and losses can be easily computed. 
 Cost-effectiveness analysis comes in many flavors. Some decisionmakers 
evaluate medical interventions by taking as fixed the goal of increasing “quality adjusted 
life years” (qalys or qualys), and comparing medical interventions on the basis of the 
ratio of qalys saved to cost. A quality adjusted life year is a measure that represents the 
value to a person of living a year with a medical condition that degrades the quality of 
life. A government medical agency with a fixed budget and the mandate to increase qalys 
will purchase medical devices with higher qaly/cost ratios until the budget is exhausted.19 
The budgetary outlay and the mandate to maximize qalys are fixed; cost-effectiveness 
analysis tells the agency which medical devices maximize qalys given the budgetary 
constraint. 
 Another example of cost-effectiveness analysis comes from its use to evaluate 
environmental projects. Suppose that a certain environmental goal – a reduction of air 
pollution, for example – is provided by statute but the agency is given the discretion to 
choose among means. The agency can mandate the washing of coal prior to its use in 
power plants, or the use of scrubbers attached to smokestacks, or some combination; or it 
can choose to put limits on the amount of pollution generated by factories while allowing 
factory owner to choose among different technologies; or it can create a system of 
                                                 
19 See Robert Fabian, The Qualy Approach, in Valuing Health for Policy: An Economic Approach 118 
(George Tolley et al. eds., 1994); Arti Kaur Rai, Rationing Through Choice: A New Approach to Cost-
Effectiveness Analysis in Health Care, 72 Ind. L.J. 1015, 1048-52 (1997). For an example from the medical 
literature, see Daniel Polsky et al., Economic Evaluation of Breast Cancer Treatment: Considering the 
Value of Patient Choice, 21 J. Clinical Oncology 1139 (2003). 
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tradable emission permits; or it can choose some other rule or framework for achieving 
the ends set by statute. For a given reduction of air pollution, each regulatory instrument 
will have a different cost. Cost-effectiveness analysis compares the costs of the different 
means, and identifies the least-cost means as the most cost-effective.20 
 A third example of cost-effectiveness analysis is its use to evaluate income 
redistribution programs. The goal is redistribution of wealth from rich to poor; the 
constraint is the willingness of taxpayers to pay for the redistribution. The policy analyst 
must evaluate different mechanisms, none of which is perfect. Tax and transfer systems, 
for example, require administratively costly determinations of need or else result in the 
inclusion of wealthy people with low income or the exclusion of poor people with higher 
incomes (for example, because they have many children or high medical costs). 
Minimum wage laws are less complex but exclude nonworkers and may hurt low-income 
workers. Tax and transfer systems distort labor-leisure choices; minimum wage laws 
impose deadweight costs on consumers or shareholders. A cost-effectiveness analysis 
cuts through these apparent incommensurables, and shows that tax and transfer systems 
are likely to be superior: holding constant the payments to beneficiaries, they result in 
lower social cost.21 
 The basic idea behind cost-effectiveness analysis is that of comparing alternative 
regulations or projects when either the costs or the benefits are fixed.22 The right form of 
cost-effectiveness analysis depends heavily on the statutory goal. Suppose, for example, 
that Congress appropriates $100 million and authorizes USDA to spend it on lunches for 
needy schoolchildren. Consider three alternative regulations. (1) Give the money to 
schools in poor census districts. (2) Give the money to schools in proportion to the 
number of needy students in each school. (3) Give school lunch vouchers to parents 
whose family income falls below the poverty line.23 
 
                                                 
20 For well known example, see Bruce A. Ackerman and William T. Hassler, Clean Coal/Dirty Air 66-72 
(1981). 
21 Edward M. Gramlich, Benefit-Cost Analysis of Government Programs 123-33 (1981). 
22 I follow the simple discussion in Edith Stokey & Richard Zeckhauser, A Primer for Policy Analysis 152-
55 (1978) 
23 This example is based loosely on the regulation discussed in Part III.B. 
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 Each alternative has different costs. Under #1, USDA must process applications 
from schools and monitor their behavior, to ensure that the money is used to buy lunches, 
but this approach avoids the need to determine the poverty level of individual students. 
Under #2, USDA deals with a larger number of schools and engages in more intensive 
monitoring; but it will also get more lunches to more poor students. Under #3, USDA 
must print and distribute vouchers, and ensure that they are used properly; but it will also 
reach children who are not at school, and children at schools that fail to apply for school 
lunch benefits. The regulations provide, respectively, increasing accuracy at increasing 
cost. 
Cost-effectiveness analysis of alternatives can be illustrated with a few numbers. 
If USDA itself paid all of the administrative costs (including those of the schools and 
parents) from the appropriation, the calculation would be simple. Just choose the 
regulation that gets the most lunches to needy children. If, as is more likely, USDA’s 
administrative costs come from another appropriation, and schools and parents must 
absorb their own administrative costs, then a slightly more complex calculation is needed, 
as illustrated by Table 3. 
 
Table 3: School Lunch Example – Appropriation Fixed 
Reg. 
Lunches to 
Needy 
Children 
Lunches 
to Other 
Children 
Total Admin. 
Costs 
Approp. + 
Admin. 
Costs 
Cost per 
Lunch to 
Needy Child 
#1 15 million 5 m. $10 m. $110 m. $7.33 
#2 18 m. 2 m. $20 m. $120 m. $6.67 
#3 19 m. 1 m. $30 m. $130 m. $6.84 
 
According to these figures, regulation #2 is the most cost-effective: it sends lunches to 
needy children at least cost per child. 
 Congress might alternatively pass a statute that directs USDA to provide lunches 
for, say, 18 million needy children, to be paid out of a general appropriation. Again, 
USDA would come up with various alternative regulations, and compare them. It would 
modify the regulations so that they would achieve the statutory end, and then compare 
them, as in Table 4. 
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Table 4: School Lunch Example – Benefit Fixed 
Reg. 
Lunches to 
Needy 
Children 
Lunches 
to Other 
Children 
Total Admin. 
Costs 
Cost of 
Lunches ($5 
per Lunch) 
Cost per 
Lunch to 
Needy Child 
#1 20 million 8 m. $13 m. $140 m. $7.65 
#2 20 m. 4 m. $23 m. $120 m. $7.15 
#3 20 m. 1.5 m. $33 m. $107.5 m. $7.03 
 
Now regulation #3 is the most cost-effective. 
 I have simplified in order to convey the basic principles of cost-effectiveness 
analysis. A few observations are now necessary. First, note the difference between cost-
benefit analysis and cost-effectiveness analysis. All of these regulations would fail a 
standard cost-benefit analysis because a transfer to needy children is not a “benefit” in the 
conventional economic sense – it’s just a transfer. The cost to the taxpayer offsets the 
benefit to the needy child, and the administrative costs are a deadweight loss. To fulfill 
the congressional mandate to transfer resources to needy children, USDA could not use 
cost-benefit analysis. 
 Second, the cost-effectiveness analysis, as I have performed it, assumes that the 
value of getting a lunch to a non-needy child is zero. This might be a reasonable 
assumption, but it also might not be true. Congress could worry that non-needy children 
do not always have nutritional lunches and want to remedy this situation. Thus, a more 
accurate cost-effectiveness analysis might attach some weight to a lunch received by a 
non-needy child – say, 10 percent of the value of a lunch to a needy child – and the 
agency could use this weighting in the cost-effectiveness analysis; it should also make the 
weighting explicit, so that elected officials would know the basis of the decision. In some 
situations, this might produce different results – regulation #1 might be better than #2 or 
#3 – but it also seems reasonable for the agency to take its lead from Congress, and not 
attach value to the receipt of lunches by non-needy children unless Congress says 
otherwise. 
 Third, one might argue in the first example that the choice of regulation #2 
defeats Congress’s purpose: Congress wants to get as many lunches to needy children as 
possible, and for that purpose regulation #3 is better, even if more costly per lunch. But it 
would be better for USDA to return to Congress and ask for a larger appropriation, so 
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that 19 million needy children would be benefited using regulation #2, explaining that the 
extra budgetary expense is less than the administrative costs under regulation #3. 
 Fourth, one should note that Congress could choose different ends – at a higher or 
lower level of abstraction. Congress could ask USDA to ensure that all children have 
adequate nutrition, understanding that poorer children need more aid. Congress could 
give USDA the option to provide school breakfasts as well as lunches, or more food 
stamps, or cash assistance, or educational programs about good eating habits, and so 
forth. Congress might also stipulate the nutritional content of the lunches, or leave that 
decision up to USDA. The more discretion that USDA has, the more complex the cost-
effectiveness analysis will be. As the level of abstraction increases, cost-effectiveness 
analysis becomes the same as cost-benefit analysis. 
 One problem with using cost-effectiveness analysis to evaluate transfer 
regulations is that if the underlying transfer statute itself is bad, then we are firmly in the 
world of the second best, and cost-effectiveness analysis might have perverse effects. 
Consider a statute that appropriates $100 million for dairy producers because of their 
political influence and not because of any legitimate need. A highly cost-effective statute 
will result in more money in the pockets of the dairy producers, and less squandered on 
administrative expenses, but that just means more slops in the political trough, and more 
lobbyists sidling up to it.24 (This problem is not as severe for regulations that survive 
cost-benefit analysis.25) Cost-effectiveness is not an ultimate moral value; the social value 
of even a highly cost-effective regulation depends on the social value of the statutory 
program that it implements. For that reason, it might be desirable for agencies to evaluate 
the authorizing statute as well as the regulations. This is the topic of the next section. 
 
B. Analysis of the Authorizing Statute 
 When Congress authorizes a distribution to a particular group, agencies cannot 
usually prevent the distribution from occurring as intended.26 But there are actions short 
                                                 
24 Cf. Gary Becker & Casey Mulligan, Accounting for the Growth of Government (unpublished 
manuscript, 1998). 
25 Though there are some potential similar problems. See Eric A. Posner, Controlling Agencies with Cost-
Benefit Analysis: A Positive Political Theory Perspective, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1137 (2001). 
26 I put aside the controversy over whether the president or agencies have the authority to refuse to spend 
appropriated moneys. Regarding presidential impoundment see Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35 
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of interference that might improve distributional outcomes and the political process that 
leads to them. Of special interest are reporting requirements, such as those created by 
NEPA, which requires agencies to issue environmental impact statements.27 Rather than 
banning activity that harms the environment, NEPA requires agencies to estimate and 
report the environmental impact of projects such as the construction of highways.28 
Opponents of the regulation cannot seek relief from a court unless an agency fails to issue 
an adequate environmental impact statement. If the environmental impact statement is 
adequate, opponents must take their case to elected officials and seek a political remedy. 
 Agencies that issue transfer regulations could similarly be required to report the 
welfare costs and distributional effects of these regulations – that is, to issue “welfare 
impact statements.” If the welfare impact is objectionable, then critics can bring this 
information to politicians and lobby for reform. The welfare impact statement would 
include the following information.  
 Distribution of benefits. In 1999 Congress passed an appropriations bill that 
provided relief to dairy producers who had incurred large losses after the collapse of 
dairy prices. The bill directed USDA to give money to dairy producers, but did not say 
(a) which dairy producers would receive money, and (b) how much money each would 
receive.29 USDA promulgated a transfer regulation that, among other things, distributed 
moneys to dairy producers on the basis of their production in 1997 and 1998. As I will 
discuss in Part III.C., USDA used both years in order to avoid the cost of collecting new 
information from producers who had provided 1997 production figures when enrolled in 
the program the year before, but as a result some firms, including firms that had stopped 
production, would receive payments even though they did not lose money in 1998 as a 
result of the market collapse. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
(1975); R. Abascal & J. Kramer, Presidential Impoundment, Part I: Historical Genesis and Constitutional 
Framework, 62 Geo. L.J. 1549 (1974); R Abascal & J. Kramer, Presidential Impoundment Part II: Judicial 
and Legislative Responses, 63 Geo. L.J. 149 (1974). Regarding the line item veto see Elizabeth Garrett, 
Accountability and Restraint: The Federal Budget Process and the Line Item Veto Act, 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 
871 (1999). See also J. Gregory Sidak, The President's Power of the Purse, 1989 Duke L.J. 1162 (1989). 
27 See National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§4321 et. seq. (2003). 
28 There is no substantive review under NEPA. 
29 See Part III.C. 
 16 
The statement that accompanied the USDA’s transfer regulation did not explicitly 
describe the distributive consequences, though they could have been inferred from the 
formula in the regulation by someone who had data about the structure of the industry. 
The agency had information about the industry, and could have provided more detailed 
information about the distributional effects of the regulation. It could, for example, have 
broken down producers by size, and describes the average level of compensation for each 
group of producers – both in absolute terms and as a percentage of each producer’s loss. 
The agency could also have provided correlations between compensation level and other 
attributes such as location, number of employees, and so forth. 
 The reason for requiring the agency to provide this information is that it facilitates 
monitoring of the agency by Congress, affected parties, and the public.30 To the extent 
that agencies can provide a concise, numerical account of the distribution of benefits, 
Congress or relevant staffers or committees can relatively easily check that the agency is 
acting consistently with statutory goals. If the agency is not, Congress can in future 
exercise greater oversight or enact more precise statutes.31 
 Deadweight costs. It is possible that these distributional effects of the dairy 
market regulation, though not intended by Congress, could have been justified by a cost-
effectiveness analysis, which would show that a more accurate distribution of benefits 
would have entailed excessive administrative costs. But even if this is the case, there is 
the further question whether the basic statutory goal of compensating dairy producers is 
desirable, given the inevitable welfare losses that accompany any distributional scheme. 
One might think that Congress took these costs into account when it enacted the statute, 
or that the agency has no basis for questioning Congress’s decision in any event. But 
NEPA suggests a different view. Congress both authorizes agencies to approve projects 
that have harmful environmental impacts and requires agencies to issue a report 
describing these impacts. The reason is presumably to provide a check on agencies that 
focus too much on their mission and discount environmental concerns. Similarly, 
Congress could ask agencies both to redistribute wealth and to report the welfare 
distortions caused by redistribution. 
                                                 
30 See Sunstein, Risk and Reason, supra note __, at ch. 8, on the effects of informational regulations. 
31 Exec. Order 12,866 already requires a discussion of distribution, but agencies usually respond with 
boilerplate. 
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In welfare economics, it is often said that a transfer does not have any efficiency 
effects, but this statement is a simplification that does not take account of so-called 
indirect costs. Every transfer requires taxation and all taxation (except under never-found 
circumstances) causes distortions. The $200 million appropriated for dairy producers 
comes from the pockets of taxpayers, and will distort their choices between labor and 
leisure as well as other activities. There are standard, albeit rough, ways to measure this 
welfare loss and the welfare loss could be reported by the agency.32 Prescriptive 
regulations that redistribute wealth though market restrictions cause even greater 
distortions, which can also be calculated and reported.33 In addition, the behavior of 
recipients of transfers can also be distorted as long as the transfer is not a surprise. The 
dairy industry knows that it will receive transfers from Congress when dairy prices 
collapse; as a result, producers do not allocate resources efficiently. Some should not be 
in business in the first place; others should diversify or take other steps to protect 
themselves against downturns. Every transfer reinforces the expectation that Congress 
will intervene in the future, and thus results in distortions. These distortions can be 
calculated and reported. 
 The reason for reporting this information is that Congress and the public might 
not know the economic cost of the transfers that have been authorized. The report of 
deadweight costs makes it explicit that the transfer of money to dairy producers and other 
interest groups has effects beyond the obvious distributional changes. People who are 
willing to tolerate the distributional changes might change their minds when they learn 
the accompanying deadweight cost. In many circumstances, there will not be the political 
will to repeal statutory transfers or resist enacting them in the first place, but greater 
public awareness of their costs might have a desirable effect on the margin. 
 Pareto-Superior Regulations. As a supplement to the information on deadweight 
costs, an agency could propose a statutory scheme that is Pareto superior to the 
authorizing statute.34 Frequently, this will be impractical or pointless, but in many cases 
the proposal would make clear the problems with the statute. For example, it is often the 
                                                 
32 See Rosen, supra note _, at 305-322. 
33 See Gramlich, supra note __, at 123-33. 
34 Cf. Stephen Coate, An Efficiency Approach to the Evaluation of Policy Changes, 110 Econ. J. 437 
(2000); Ivan Little, A Critique of Welfare Economics (1958). 
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case that giving cash to beneficiaries is Pareto superior to using price controls or quantity 
limits. Consider a statutory program that benefits farmers by increasing prices and 
revenues through restrictions on production. If, instead, the quotas were eliminated and 
farmers were given cash equal to the implicit subsidy created by the quotas, there would 
be money left over for taxpayers or other beneficiaries. 
 We might imagine that when an agency proposes a quota regulation pursuant to a 
statute that provides for quotas, it will also report the Pareto superior statutory scheme. 
The report could be sent to Congress, which might then decide to stop the regulation and 
appropriate money for the proposed transfer.35 Although Congress might often refuse to 
enact the Pareto superior appropriation because of inertia, time constraints, or a desire to 
retain the disguise on the transfer, in some cases it might well prefer the Pareto superior 
appropriation, and act accordingly. 
 I have argued that regulatory oversight of transfer regulations would be improved 
if agencies reported three kinds of information: the distributive effects of the regulation; 
its welfare costs; and any Pareto superior alternatives. As Part IV will discuss, Executive 
Order 12,866 already authorizes the first type of reporting, and probably the other two as 
well, but a statute modeled on NEPA might also be desirable. Just as NEPA requires 
agencies to report the environmental impact of regulations without directly banning 
environmentally unsound regulations, the proposed statute would require agencies to 
report the welfare impact of regulations without directly banning distributively unjust 
regulations. The agency would, in effect, route opponents of the regulation to the political 
process.36 The benefits to the political process could be expected to be similar to those 
that NEPA has produced. 
 There is, however, an important objection to reporting requirements. NEPA has, 
in practice, imposed considerable administrative and litigation costs on agencies. 
Environmentalists have used NEPA to delay and block regulations: agencies frequently 
have decided that the administrative and litigation costs, and perhaps the political costs as 
                                                 
35 A legislative veto is illegal, but informal pressure on the agency might be sufficient, or else a statutory 
injunction against the regulation would be necessary. 
36 There are other programs designed to regulate through information disclosure; one prominent example is 
the toxics release inventory. See Madhu Khanna et al., Toxics Release Information: A Policy Tool for 
Environmental Protection, 36 J. Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt. 243 (1998). 
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well, are so high that an otherwise legal regulation is not worth defending.37 The NEPA 
experience suggests that reporting requirements for transfer regulations might involve 
high administrative costs, and be used as a weapon against transfer regulations. Whether 
this is good or bad depends on how high the costs will be, and what kind of regulations 
are likely to blocked. It is possible that reporting requirements can, in the American legal 
and political system, only generate either boilerplate (if the legal standard is low) or 
excessive litigation (if the legal standard is high), in which case reporting requirements 
for transfer regulations would be inadvisable. Much depends on whether there are groups 
that will monitor welfare impact statements, and take agencies to court when they fail to 
issue adequate welfare impact statements, as environmental groups have done for 
environmental impact statements. Too much enthusiasm for litigation might lead to 
interference with normal agency functions; however, too little enthusiasm might again 
lead to statements containing nothing but boilerplate. 
 
C. Mixed Regulations and Distributional Questions 
 Many statutes authorize agencies to issue prescriptive regulations that both cure 
market failures and effect transfers to particular groups. A statute designed to restrict 
pollution might insist that factories in one region cut emissions more than factories in 
another region; or that all factories use a technology that is cheaper for some factories 
than for others. If Congress could have achieved its goals equally well or better without 
making these distinctions, then the statute self-consciously redistributes wealth compared 
to a statute whose distributional effects follow naturally from the primary goal of 
correcting a market failure. The agency must accept statutory constraints, and when it 
performs cost-benefit analysis it implicitly must exclude alternative regulations that have 
a higher benefit-cost ratio but that do not have the prescribed distributional effects.38 
 More interesting, when agencies have a broad mandate to solve market failures, 
they will face two possible situations: (1) where there is a single optimal regulation that 
                                                 
37 For a discussion, see Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing 
Government’s Environmental Performance, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 903, 917 (2002). 
38 One might prefer to say that the decision procedure is cost-effectiveness analysis but this is just a matter 
of labeling. 
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might or might not have desirable distributional effects; and (2) where there are multiple 
regulations with equal benefit-cost ratios and different distributional effects. 
 In the first case, cost-benefit analysis supports one outcome. If the agency 
promulgates a different regulation with a more attractive distributive effect, that 
regulation is a mixed regulation. There is reason to think that agencies do this. When 
agencies justify regulations they often explain how they designed the regulation so that 
the burden is not concentrated on the poor, or on a particular segment of the population, 
or on residents of a particular geographical area; or they note that the regulation favors 
small businesses at the expense of big businesses. For example, in 1982 EPA proposed 
regulations governing the lead content limits for gasoline that imposed stricter standards 
on larger refineries than on small refineries.39 And agencies are directed to do this, in part 
by executive orders, and perhaps also in part by a political sense of the groups that 
Congress or oversight committee members care about.40 In all these cases, the agency’s 
decision procedure is most accurately described not as cost-benefit analysis, but as cost-
effectiveness analysis of various routes to some distributional goal. 
 In the second case, cost-benefit analysis does not distinguish among multiple 
regulations with different distributional effects, and for that reasons the agency must 
issue a mixed regulation that reflects an implicit or explicit decision about distribution. In 
the absence of legislative guidance, the agency might rely on any of the factors described 
in the previous paragraph, or its own beliefs about distributional equities. In this case, the 
agency’s decision procedure is cost-benefit analysis, but supplemented with (not 
constrained by) a distributive judgment. 
 A related question – but one that can only be mentioned and not answered here – 
is why there is no distributional analogy to Executive Order 12,866’s mandate to use 
cost-benefit analysis. In theory, an executive order could require agencies that are given 
vague statutory direction to promulgate prescriptive or transfer regulations that meet 
certain distributional criteria. Indeed, it appears that agencies already do this, albeit in a 
                                                 
39 Environmental Protection Agency, Final Rule: Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives, 47 Fed. Reg. 
49,322 (Oct. 29, 1982). 
40 Executive Order 12,866, §1(b)(5) (distributive impact); Executive Order 13,132 (federalism); Exec. 
Order 12,898 (environmental justice); 2003 OMB Draft Report, 68 Fed. Reg., at 5514. 
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an ad hoc way.41 The question is why OMB does not demand more consistent and 
specific distributional results – for example, regulations that improve the Gini coefficient, 
or some other measure of equality.42 No doubt the answer has to do with the difficulty of 
specifying distributional criteria that are as clear as the cost-benefit standard, but this 
difficulty itself is something of a mystery.43 
 
D. The Opportunities and Limits of OMB Review 
 The OMB has been the chief force behind the spread of cost-benefit principles 
among agencies, and it could serve a similar role for cost-effectiveness analysis. How 
cost-effectiveness analysis of transfer regulations might improve the political process 
depends on the goals and incentives of the relevant political actors. We can distinguish 
two broad possibilities – both are caricatures intended only to make clear the forces at 
work. 
 Congress is honest but agencies are not. Suppose that Congress honestly 
legislates in the public interest, but that agencies have specific goals or missions that 
deviate from congressional goals. Congress has diverse methods for disciplining 
agencies, but with agenda setting power and superior information about their regulatory 
domain agencies can issue regulations that differ from Congress’ ideal. However, if 
agencies were required to perform cost-effectiveness analyses on transfer regulations, and 
faced sanctions if they did not, they would be, in effect, forced to divulge some of their 
private information, which would facilitate monitoring by Congress or the relevant 
committees. Here, cost-effectiveness analysis, like cost-benefit analysis of prescriptive 
market-correcting regulations, is a device for solving a principal-agent problem.44 
 Congress is dishonest but the president is not. Suppose that Congress seeks to pay 
off interest groups, while the President, with his broad national mandate, prefers to 
regulate in the public interest. Transfer statutes, then, do not distribute wealth to 
deserving beneficiaries, but to interest groups. However, because Congress enacts vague 
                                                 
41 See the farm relief regulation discussed in Part III.A.; the agency imposed a cap on the size of the 
transfer without any statutory authority, thus favoring smaller producers relative to larger producers 
(though not necessarily wealthier producers relative to poorer producers). 
42 For a discussion of measures of equality, see Joseph E. Stiglitz, Economics of the Public Sector 230-35 
(1986). 
43 See Larry Temkin, Inequality (1996). 
44 Cf. Posner, supra note __. 
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statutes that delegate a great deal of discretion to agencies, the president can use his 
authority over the agencies to counter Congress’s efforts. Vague statutes that appear 
public spirited but are designed to benefit interest groups become less effective at 
inspiring regulations that pay off interest groups. Consider a tax credit law that has the 
overt aim of creating jobs but is in fact intended to, or partly intended to, benefit firms 
that fill out the forms for companies that claim the tax credit.45 If the statute is vague 
enough, and does not explicitly require contracting with members of the interest group, 
then a regulation that does involve that group is likely to fail a cost-effectiveness 
analysis. Thus, the president, through OMB, can use the cost-effectiveness obligation to 
resist congressional efforts to disguise transfers, forcing Congress either to make the 
transfers explicit – which entails political costs – or to abandon them. 
 
E. Judicial Review 
 Judicial deference to agency action is justified by division of labor: agencies are 
specialists, judges are generalists. The problem with judicial deference is that agencies 
can use their discretion in ways that are inconsistent with social welfare and 
congressional policy, as the case may be. Agencies might transfer resources to politically 
powerful interest groups or indulge ideological passions not shared by the public. The 
virtue of cost-benefit analysis (as a statutory mandate) is that it harnesses the power of 
quantification, permitting courts to scrutinize an agency’s decision without reproducing 
it. When monetization of costs and benefits does not otherwise distort the agency’s 
mission too much, judicial enforcement of cost-benefit analysis will produce better 
regulations, regulations that do not reflect the internal biases of the agency or its chief.46 
 As we have seen, cost-benefit analysis cannot be used to evaluate transfer 
regulations. If judges enforced cost-benefit analysis, all transfer regulations would be 
struck down. However, with legislative authorization – or through aggressive 
interpretation of the arbitrary and capricious standard47 – courts could use cost-
effectiveness analysis to review transfer regulations. This could take many forms. At the 
                                                 
45 Compare to the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit (now the Work Opportunity Tax Credit), discussed in Elizabeth 
Garrett, Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of Offset Requirements in the Tax Legislative Process, 65 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 501, 521-22 (1998). 
46 This is Sunstein’s view (see Sunstein, Risk and Reason, supra note __), but many disagree. 
47 See the discussion of a judicial opinion in Part III.C., below. 
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lowest levels, courts would remand regulations when the accompanying statement in the 
Federal Register does not include cost-effectiveness ratios for the regulation itself and for 
a range of plausible alternative regulations. In addition, a transfer regulation that is less 
cost-effective than an alternative that is within the agency’s authority would be vacated 
on judicial review, and on remand the agency would be required to issue the cost-
effective transfer regulation. There would still be role for judicial deference, as in the 
case for cost-benefit analysis. Determining the distributional goals of a statute would 
need to be discretionary within a broad range. But this would not mean that the agency is 
unconstrained. At a minimum, agencies would be required to act consistently across 
regulations. In a similar way, although agencies have some discretion to choose discount 
factors and valuations of life for cost-benefit analysis, a consistency requirement across 
regulations and agencies constrains their behavior in useful ways.48 
 My suggestion is not radical. Courts already review agencies’ cost-effectiveness 
analyses when transfer regulations are the subject of litigation. Part III will discuss some 
examples.49 But, as we will see, the judicial efforts are dispiriting. Although courts focus 
on the right issues – whether inaccurate distributions should be tolerated in order to 
reduce administrative costs – courts rarely demand that agencies provide data that support 
their cost-effectiveness analyses, and so it is always hard to see why courts approve some 
transfer regulations while rejecting others. One senses that courts rely on a rough sense of 
the ideal distributional outcome intended by the statute and are impatient with arguments 
that administrative cost savings justify reliance on crude proxies or bright line rules that 
result in distributions that deviate from the ideal. If courts think it proper to defer to 
agency judgments, then they should not reject these arguments; if they think it proper to 
scrutinize the agency’s claims, they should demand data and based their own judgment 
on an assessment of the facts. Currently, they do neither. 
  
                                                 
48 Posner, supra note __. 
49 Here are two others: McDaniels v. United States, 300 F.3d 407 (4th Cir. 2002), where the court defended 
the agency’s decision to use gross revenues as a crude proxy for net income on grounds of administrative 
cost; and Michigan Head Start Directors Association Tri-County Community Action, Inc. v. Butz, 397 
F.Supp. 1124, 1140 (D.W.Mich. 1975), where the court rejected a similar crude proxy on the ground that 
the administrative cost savings (nowhere specified) were insufficient. 
 24 
III. SOME EXAMPLES 
 According to the OMB reports to Congress, agencies have promulgated several 
hundred transfer regulations, counting only those regulations that have had an impact of 
at least $100 million or are otherwise considered “major” under OMB’s conventions. 
Each one of these regulations was published in the Federal Register along with a 
statement that the regulation complied with Executive Order 12,886. Many of the 
statements contain boilerplate, but a significant number contain a cost-effectiveness 
analysis, or a gesture in that direction. 
 No scholar has tried to determine whether these regulations are, as a group, cost-
effective. At first sight, this gap in the literature seems odd, for there is a large literature 
on the related question whether prescriptive regulations issued under market-correcting 
statutes are cost-justified.50 But the reason for the different levels of attention devoted to 
these questions is probably that agencies’ cost-benefit analyses supply much more data 
than agencies’ cost-effectiveness analyses, making scholarly review of the cost-benefit 
analyses easier. 
 In the absence of data about cost-effectiveness, the best way to determine whether 
agencies issue cost-effective transfer regulations would be through an empirical study 
that lined up all the regulations and determined whether their cost-effectiveness ratios 
were superior to plausible alternatives. Such a study, however, would be nearly 
impossible. One cannot know whether a regulation that provides school lunches at $5 per 
lunch is cost-effective unless one knows what alternatives are available, and if the agency 
does not provide a thorough and credible discussion of the alternatives (and they never 
do, as far as I have found), one could not know what these alternatives would be without 
becoming an expert in every field of regulation.51 As a result, one cannot evaluate 
transfer regulations on the basis of their cost-effectiveness in the same systematic way 
                                                 
50 J. F. Morrall III, A Review of the Record, 10 Regulation 25 (1986). Morrall’s study did not determine the 
cost-benefit ratios – he excluded the non-health benefits of the regulations – which would technically be the 
correct variable. Other scholars have tried to do this. See, e.g., R. W. Hahn et al, Assessing Regulatory 
Impact Analyses: The Failure of Agencies to Comply with Executive Order 12,866, 23 Harv. J. L. & Pub. 
Pol. 859, 871 (2000). 
51 Academics have studied the cost-effectiveness of various medical interventions, but there is virtually no 
scholarship on the cost-effectiveness of individual Medicare regulations. Cf. David M. Cutler, Health Care 
and the Public Sector, in 4 Handbook of Public Economics 2145 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds. 
2002). 
 25 
that John Morrall evaluated health and safety regulations on the basis of their implicit 
valuations of life.52 
 For these reasons, I will take the less ambitious route and evaluate the quality of 
the cost-effectiveness analysis in a small sample of regulations. The point here is not to 
defend or criticize the regulations themselves, but to evaluate the reasoning of the 
agency. 
 
A. Farm Relief 
 In 1998 farm prices collapsed and Congress responded by appropriating funds for 
the relief of farmers and dairy producers who were harmed by the decline in prices. In 
1999 Congress appropriated $3 billion, of which $200 million were directed to dairy 
producers “in a manner determined by the Secretary” of USDA.53 The Secretary thus had 
to develop a formula for distributing the $200 million among the many dairy producers 
who lost money. This is not as easy as it sounds: the problem is determining how much a 
particular producer lost as a result of the price decline. One idea would be to look at how 
much milk the producer manufactured in the year prior to the market collapse, and give 
the producer an amount of money equal to the industry wide average level of profits per 
unit of milk that the affected producer manufactured in the prior year. This formula, 
however, would overcompensate unprofitable producers: if these producers would have 
made no profits in 1998 even if prices had not declined, any payment would 
overcompensate them. On the other hand, it would have been very difficult to determine 
the lost income of each producer on the basis of a projection to 1998. Thus, the Secretary 
chose a bright line rule that awarded a fixed amount per unit of milk produced in the 
earlier year. She also capped compensation at 2.5 million pounds of milk. This cap 
favored smaller producers. 
 In 2000 Congress appropriated another $325 million for dairy producers (and 
livestock producers as well), directing the Secretary to use the money “to compensate 
                                                 
52 Morrall, supra note __. 
53 Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, §101(a), Tit. XI, 
§1111(d) (1998). 
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producers for economic losses incurred during 1999.”54 The Secretary maintained the cap 
issued under the prior regulation, and also provided that producers signed up in the first 
year of the program would be automatically enrolled in the second year of the program. 
Payments would be based on production in 1997 and 1998. As a result, producers who 
had gone out of business in 1999 or even 1998 would nonetheless obtain compensation as 
though they had been in business but had lost money. Milk Train, a consortium of large 
milk producers, brought suit against the Secretary, arguing that the cap and the automatic 
enrollment provisions favored smaller dairy producers. The cap clearly prevented larger 
producers from obtaining compensation for their losses beyond the cap; and the 
automatic enrollment provisions extended this preferential treatment to producers 
(presumably, smaller producers) who were no longer in the dairy business. 
 The Secretary argued that the rule complied with Executive Order 12,866 (the 
most recent cost-benefit executive order) and passed a cost-benefit test,55 a claim that was 
apparently accepted by the D.C. Circuit Court.56 Although the agency’s description of the 
cost-benefit analysis is hard to follow, the Secretary seemed to believe that a payment of 
$173 million to dairy producers could create benefits of $400 to $600 million. “The 
differences between outlays, which are virtually all direct transfers to program 
participants, and income, are made up of increased dairy prices....”57 This explanation 
does not make any sense. Cash transfers to dairy producers would not normally increase 
dairy prices, but even if they did, the loss to consumers – not mentioned anywhere – 
would offset the gain in income. 
 The Crop and Market Loss Assistance rule fails a cost-benefit analysis, as indeed 
does any rule that determines how money appropriated by Congress would be distributed 
to beneficiaries. But it does not follow that any rule that the Secretary might promulgate 
would be equally bad or good. The Milk Train case centered on just this question. Milk 
Train complained that the rule violated the statute by favoring smaller producers; and the 
                                                 
54 Agricultural, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations 
Act 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-78, §§ 805, 825, 822 (1999). 
55 Department of Agriculture, 1999 Crop and Market Loss Assistance, 65 Fed. Reg. 7942, 7948 (Feb. 16, 
2000). 
56 Milk Train, Inc., v. Veneman, 310 F.3d 744, 754 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Executive Order 12,866 cannot be 
enforced by a court; the argument probably was made because a cost-justified regulation would not seem 
arbitrary and capricious under the APA. 
57 1999 Crop and Market Loss Assistance, 65 Fed. Reg., at 7948. 
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Secretary argued that deviations from the statutory goal were justified by administrative 
cost savings. 
 It is possible that the automatic enrollment portion of the rule was more cost-
effective than an alternative procedure, such as a requirement that dairy producers fill out 
new applications and provide supporting evidence. The automatic enrollment provision 
was intended to avoid the cost of applying for compensation and the cost of processing 
applications, the first borne by the producers and the second borne by USDA. The 
provision also would result in the transfer of moneys to producers who had gone out of 
business, leaving less in the treasury for the intended beneficiaries of the statute. The 
question, then, is whether the administrative cost savings justified these error costs. 
Answering this question requires some numbers. USDA could have estimated the 
application and processing costs by extrapolating from its past experiences with 
administering transfer programs, and USDA could have estimated the error costs from 
industry data on liquidations of producers. It seems likely that these estimates would have 
been relatively easy to make, and not involve vast administrative expenses. But because 
USDA did not make these estimates, and provide the relevant data, it is impossible to 
know whether the automatic enrollment provision was cost-effective. 
 It is less likely that the cap was cost-effective.58 It is hard to see how it could have 
saved administrative costs, while it clearly deprived large producers of their entitlements 
under the statute. 
 
B. School Breakfasts and Lunches 
 The School Breakfast Program, National School Lunch Act and Child Nutrition 
Act established the School Breakfast Program, which provided funds for eligible schools 
that offer free breakfasts to their students.59 School districts and state educational 
agencies apply for funds from the USDA, which issues regulations describing the criteria 
for eligibility. The statute provides that one goal of the program, although not the only 
goal, is to ensure that funds for breakfasts “to the maximum extent practicable ... reach 
                                                 
58 The court held that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the Secretary’s decision to impose the 
cap, which, in the court’s view, was discretionary under 701(a)(2) of the APA. 
59 42 U.S.C. §1773 (2003) (School breakfast program authorization). 
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needy children.”60 The plaintiffs, a class of needy children, argued that USDA violated 
the statute by failing to demand from school districts enough information to determine 
that needy children were being helped, and for refusing to withhold funds from schools in 
districts that failed to provide such information.61 
 The challenged regulations required that applicants provide information about 
how they planned to distribute funds, and how many schools with needy students would 
not be served, but the requirements were minimal. The states themselves defined “needy” 
in an inconsistent way, and many states did not reveal how they defined need, so that a 
school with a fair number of needy students might be defined as a non-needy school. 
Further, USDA did not have in place any process for verifying that the states provided 
accurate information; did not try to encourage states to bring more needy children within 
the program; and did not encourage compliance by threatening uncooperative school 
districts with sanctions at its disposal, such as a cutoff of federal aid.62 The court did not 
quarrel with all of these practices, but it ordered USDA to issue regulations that required 
schools to provide more information about the effect of their plans on needy children. 
 The case reflects the tradeoff between decision and error costs. USDA 
emphasized decision costs. It did not demand much information from states and did not 
verify that information, because doing so would have been too costly – both for the 
schools and for USDA. As a result, many schools would obtain funds even though they 
did not serve needy children, and many schools that served needy children would not 
obtain funds. The court’s holding implicitly assumed that more stringent information 
requirements would not burden the schools or USDA too much, but would reduce the 
amount of error. But the court was not willing to demand a great deal of extra work from 
USDA, and presumably the reason was that excessive decision costs would interfere with 
the operation of the program, burden schools, or have a similar perverse effect on the 
distribution of funds. 
 
                                                 
60 42 U.S.C. §1759a(e)(1)(C). 
61 Compare Charette v. Bergland, 457 F.Supp. 1197 (D.R.I. 1978), which also discusses the tradeoff of 
administrative and error costs. 
62 Id. at 1205-06. 
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 But the court did not explain why it thought that demanding more information 
from states was cost-justified but that verifying the accuracy of this information was not 
cost-justified. These claims are susceptible to empirical analysis. For the states, 
determining the numbers and locations of needy students in the school system is 
expensive: surveys must be conducted, answers must be verified, and data must be 
compiled. For USDA, verifying the information provided by the states might be costly 
but might not: spot checks along with the threat of cutoff funds might be sufficient to 
ensure the states’ honesty. USDA should have calculated and reported the administrative 
costs of the regulation in question, and also calculated and reported the administrative 
costs of alternative regulations that imposed more rigorous and less rigorous application 
and verification procedures. 
 On the error cost side, the statutory language indicates that Congress wanted to 
ensure that needy children received lunches, but also did not mind if non-needy children 
received lunches. At a minimum, USDA should have discussed alternative regulations, 
and in particular reported how many needy children each regulation would have likely 
helped. The estimates of the number of children who would be helped by the regulation 
could have been based on widely available demographic information concerning the 
distribution of needy and non-needy children in school districts. If USDA was charged 
with exhausting an appropriation, then the cost-effective regulation would most likely 
have been that regulation that provided lunches to the most needy children. If the 
appropriation was not determined or budgeted in advance, then the cost-effective 
regulation would be the one that provided lunches to needy children at least cost per 
lunch.63 The one complication is Congress’s apparent ambivalence about funding lunches 
for non-needy children. A regulation that saved on administrative costs but resulted in the 
funding of lunches for a number of non-needy children as well as needy children would 
arguable be more cost-effective than a regulation that resulted in substantial 
administrative costs but aided only needy children. Here, USDA would seem to be given 
discretion, but it should have reported how it used its discretion by revealing the implicit 
or explicit weight that it put on receipt of a lunch by a non-needy child. Because USDA 
                                                 
63 See Part II.A., above. 
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failed to provide the necessary information, it is impossible to evaluate USDA’s actual 
regulation on cost-effectiveness grounds. 
 
C. Food Stamps 
 The Food Stamp Program, like the School Breakfast Program, gives the Secretary 
of USDA a great deal of discretion to issue regulations, in this case “as he deems 
necessary or appropriate for the efficient administration” of the program.64 USDA issued 
regulations that, among other things, provided that food stamps would be sent by mail, 
and that the federal government would replace food stamps that were lost in the mail. 
Subsequently, Congress enacted a statute that authorized USDA to share the costs with 
the states, and USDA issued a new regulation that required states to pay for lost food 
stamps above a threshold – 0.5 percent of the value of the coupons sent through the 
mails.65 The purpose of the regulation was to give states the “incentive to reduce mail 
losses”66 – presumably by cracking down on food stamp thieves. The state of New 
Mexico brought suit challenging the cost-sharing regulation.67 
 New Mexico argued that the regulation assumed that lost coupons were inevitably 
redeemed – that is, they were not really lost but stolen and used by the thieves or 
customers of the thieves – when many coupons really were just lost. If the coupons were 
really lost, then USDA did not lose any money, aside from the trivial printing costs, when 
it replaced the coupons, and thus should not have been entitled to reimbursement from 
the state. USDA argued, and the court agreed, that “it would have been irrational for the 
Department of Agriculture to adopt a tracking system for food stamp issuances and 
redemptions as the State of New Mexico suggests. Such a system likely would cost more 
than the savings expected from the mail loss reduction program; thus it was not arbitrary 
and capricious to reject this proposal.”68 The court agreed that decision costs associated 
with the tracking regulation would have outweighed the error costs, and therefore that the 
agency’s decision was not illegal. 
                                                 
64 7 U.S.C. §2013(c) (2003). 
65 United States Department of Agriculture, Food Stamp Program: Mail Issuance Loss Tolerance Levels, 48 
Fed. Reg. 15,223 (April 8, 1983). 
66 47 Fed. Reg. 50,682 (November 9, 1982). 
67 Gallegos v. Lyng, 891 F.2d 788 (10th Cir. 1989). 
68 Gellegos, 891 F.2d at 792. 
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 As far as the opinion indicates, however, the court took the agency’s word for it 
that the tracking system would have cost more than it saved. But this claim was an 
empirical claim, susceptible to cost-effectiveness analysis. The cost of a tracking system 
included staff time and other expenses; the benefit of a tracking system was, in this case, 
the cost savings for the state, but, more broadly, the reduction of resources that would go 
to criminals rather than to the intended beneficiaries of the food stamp program. The 
cost-effectiveness inquiry is whether the tracking system would cost less in dollar terms 
than the extra appropriations needed to replace coupons that would not have been lost if a 
tracking system had been in effect. An adequate cost-effectiveness analysis would 
contain estimates of these costs. It would also have considered alternative regulations. 
 There is a further interesting federalism dimension to the regulation. The question 
was not whether USDA would have saved Congress money by using the tracking system; 
the question was whether USDA would have saved states and Congress money by using 
the tracking system. Recall that the idea of loss sharing was to give states an incentive to 
crack down on food stamp thieves and save Congress money. Even if the tracking system 
would not have been cost-effective, there was a separate question whether the 0.5 
threshold gave states the optimal incentive to invest in greater policing. A low threshold 
would cause states to externalize the costs on the federal government; but a high 
threshold would cause states to overinvest (and redundantly invest) in food stamp 
policing when it would be better for the federal government to use a centralized 
monitoring system. Indeed, this was New Mexico’s claim. USDA should have estimated 
the effects of different thresholds on the incentives of states to invest in policing. 
 Thus an adequate cost-effectiveness analysis would determine (1) how much 
different investments in policing would reduce mail thefts of food stamps; and (2) how 
sensitive states are to different cost-sharing rules. An empirical study could determine 
(roughly) the level of police investment where the marginal cost of the investment equals 
the marginal benefit in food stamp savings; and then a separate study could determine the 
cost sharing arrangement that would cause states to engage in the optimal level of 
investment. Although USDA understood this basic logic, it did not provide the relevant 
information for determining whether it performed a valid cost-effectiveness analysis. 
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D. Medicare: Outpatient Diabetes Self-Management Training 
The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 expanded Medicare coverage of self-
management training programs for diabetics.69 In 2000 HHS published a final rule that, 
among other things, limited coverage to training ordered by a physician or other qualified 
practitioner, required that the physician provide a plan of care, described the elements of 
a valid training program, and identified the medical conditions that would qualify for the 
coverage.70 The statute provided for the transfer of resources to beneficiaries; therefore, 
the regulation that implemented the statute was a transfer regulation. 
Of special interest is HHS’s discussion of Executive Order 12,866, which it said 
applied to the regulation because it would have an impact of greater than $100 million 
per year. HHS then proceeded to discuss the costs and benefits of the regulation. On the 
cost side, HHS started out promisingly. There were 4.5 million Medicare beneficiaries 
with diabetes, but because many of them already had training or would not qualify for it 
under the proposed regulation, about 2.25 million would receive benefits under the 
regulation. Each of these individuals would receive 10 to 12 hours of training. 
Multiplying the number of beneficiaries by the number of hours and by a training cost 
(not specified), and taking account the capacity of accredited programs and the time lag 
before a sufficient number would be in operation, HHS estimated budgetary costs of $150 
million in FY 2001, increasing to $280 million in FY 2005.71 But on the benefit side, 
HHS faltered. It mentioned that diabetes can cause death, heart disease, blindness, and 
many other medical problems, and that self-management can reduce these problems, but 
it did not estimate the magnitude of the reduction or monetize the health benefits.72 
One cannot know whether the regulation is cost-effective without knowing the 
effectiveness of the training program. If the effectiveness is high enough, and the benefits 
are high enough, then the regulation would be cost-effective; otherwise, it would not be. 
If it is cost-effective, what this means is that given the goal of providing aid to a class of 
people who have illnesses, it is cheaper for the government to achieve this goal by paying 
                                                 
69 Pub. L. 105-33 (August 5, 1997). 
70 Department of Health and Human Services, Health Care Financing Administration, Medicare Program; 
Expanded Coverage for Outpatient Diabetes Self-Management Training and Diabetes Outcome 
Measurements, Part II, 65 Fed. Reg. 83,130 (Dec. 29, 2000). 
71 Id. at 83,146. 
72 Id. 
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for self-management training than by paying for medical care for symptoms that could 
have been avoided through self-management. (Alternatively, cost-effectiveness analysis 
might have revealed that giving more intensive training to fewer people, or less intensive 
training to more people, would have produced a greater ratio of benefits to costs.) As is 
always the case, the cost-effectiveness analysis would not show that Medicare coverage 
is welfare maximizing; it shows that given the goals of Medicare coverage, one kind of 
transfer is superior to another. 
To sum up, HHS recognized that Executive Order 12,886 applied to the diabetes 
self-management regulation, and performed a regulatory impact analysis. But its 
regulatory impact analysis was inadequate. It identified the budgetary costs of the 
regulation, but did not reduce them to a present value. More important, it failed to 
monetize the health benefits of the regulation, and to provide an estimate of the 
probability that self-management would produce these health benefits, and it failed to 
compare the cost-benefit ratio of the regulation in question with the cost-benefit ratios of 
alternative regulations. As a result, one cannot determine from the regulatory impact 
analysis whether the regulation is cost-effective. 
 
IV. LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF TRANSFER REGULATIONS 
 
 Executive Order 12,866 requires agencies to perform cost-effectiveness analysis 
on transfer regulations. Several clauses of this order are pertinent: 
 
When an agency determines that a regulation is the best available method of 
achieving the regulatory objective, it shall design its regulations in the most 
cost-effective manner to achieve the regulatory objective. In doing so, each 
agency shall consider incentives for innovation, consistency, predictability, 
the costs of enforcement and compliance (to the government, regulated 
entities, and the public), flexibility, distributive impacts, and equity.73 
 
This provision appears to apply to transfer regulations. Other provisions of the executive 
order command agencies to conduct cost-benefit analysis; this provision seems to 
acknowledge that a cost-benefit analysis might not be consistent with the “regulatory 
                                                 
73 Exec. Order 12,866 §(1)(b)(5); see also 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (October 4, 1993). 
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objective.” If the regulatory objective is not efficiency, it must be redistribution.74 
Because the regulatory objective is set by statute, the president cannot override it through 
an executive order. But the president can, given standard views of presidential power, 
guide the means that agencies use to obtain the objective, and this surely includes 
requiring agencies to use less rather than more expensive methods for achieving the 
objective. The agency must choose the most “cost-effective manner” for achieving this 
distribution, one that takes account of “the costs of enforcement and compliance” – what 
we have called decisions costs – and distributive impacts – what we have called error 
costs. 
 An additional provision requires agencies to provide information about these costs 
and benefits. The provision says that the agency should provide: 
 
An assessment, including the underlying analysis, of costs and benefits of 
potentially effective and reasonably feasible alternatives to the planned 
regulation, identified by the agencies or the public (including improving the 
current regulation and reasonably viable nonregulatory actions), and an 
explanation why the planned regulatory action is preferable to the identified 
potential alternatives.75 
 
This is a reporting requirement, and could be used to force agencies to reveal the results 
of a cost-effectiveness analysis. 
 Agencies have not (with a few exceptions) accepted these invitations to perform 
cost-effectiveness analysis on transfer regulations, but OMB could prod them to, as OMB 
has prodded agencies to perform cost-benefit analysis on regulations designed to solve 
market failures. Following the cost-benefit model, OMB could announce that agencies 
should conduct cost-effectiveness analysis of transfer regulations and that OMB will send 
back to agencies any transfer regulations that are not accompanied by a satisfactory 
assessment of their cost-effectiveness. 
 Executive Order 12,866 does not direct agencies to report the economic 
distortions caused by the transfer statute, as implemented in regulations, or to report 
                                                 
74 Or some other non-efficiency moral goal such as changing preferences, but this is not the case in the 
transfer regulations that I have examined. 
75 Exec. Order 12,866 §(6)(a)(3)(C)(iii); see also 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (October 4, 1993). 
 35 
Pareto superior distributions that are outside the authority of the agency.76 To achieve this 
end, either the president would need to amend the executive order, OMB would need to 
issue new guidelines, or Congress would need to enact a statute modeled on NEPA. The 
new language might say: 
 
All major transfer regulations must be accompanied by a report of (1) 
alternative rules or transfers of money, if any, that would obtain the same 
distributive goals at a lower cost; and (2) a calculation of the economic 
distortions caused by the transfer regulations. 
 
For example, a major regulation that implements price supports would identify potential 
tax-and-transfer regimes for obtaining the same distributional goals at lower cost; and 
would calculate the economic cost of the price supports. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 Executive Order 12,886 already requires regulatory agencies to perform cost-
benefit or cost-effectiveness analysis for major regulations, and agencies have correctly 
concluded that transfer regulations are not exempt. But they have rarely performed cost-
effectiveness analysis, and their occasional efforts have been inadequate. 
 Given the current low level, agencies could improve regulatory performance 
dramatically by following some simple precepts. Agencies should always report several 
alternative regulations, not just the regulation that they propose. These alternatives could 
be generated by staff or by outsiders, including regulated entities. Agencies should 
describe the distributional effects and administrative costs of each regulation, and provide 
cost-effectiveness ratios under alternative assumptions. Agencies should discount costs 
and benefits as they do when performing cost-benefit analysis. And agencies should 
calculate and report the welfare costs of their regulations. 
 Courts frequently review cost-effectiveness analyses performed by agencies when 
litigants challenge transfer regulations under the Administrative Procedure Act, but their 
judgments do not inspire confidence. Judicial review would be more valuable if courts 
demanded that agencies supply the data used in the cost-effectiveness analyses, and had a 
                                                 
76 One could possibly find some authority in Exec. Order 12,866 §§(1)(a) and (1)(b)(5). 
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more adequate understanding of cost-effectiveness principles. Although many courts 
understand that administrative cost savings justify reliance on transfer regulations that are 
rough rather than specific, they need to understand that one cannot evaluate transfer 
regulations properly without information about the cost savings and the expected 
distribution of benefits. 
 37 
APPENDIX 
 
Transfer Regulations Reviewed by OMB Between 4/1/00 and 9/30/0177 
 
Dept. of Agriculture 
Agricultural Disaster and Market Assistance 
2000 Crop Agricultural Disaster and Market Assistance 
Market Assistance for Cottonseed, Tobacco, and Wool and Mohair 
Bioenergy Program 
Farm Storage Facility Loan Program 
Wool, Mohair, and Apple Market Loss Assistance Programs 
Dairy, Honey, and Cranberry Market Loss Assistance and Sugar Programs 
Livestock Assistance, American Indian Livestock Feed, Pasture Recovery, and Dairy Price Support Programs 
2000 Crop Disaster Program 
Catastrophic Risk Protection Endorsement 
Food Stamp Program: Recipient Claim Establishment and Collection Standards 
National School Lunch and School Breakfast Program: Additional menu Planning Approaches 
Requirements for and Evaluation of WIC Program Bid Solicitations for Infant Formula Rebate Contracts 
Non-Discretionary Provisions of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 
Non-Citizen Eligibility and Certification Provisions of Public Law 104-193 
Food Stamp Program: Personal Responsibility Provisions of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act of 1996 
 
Dept. of Defense 
Tricare: Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS), NDAA for FY 2001 and 
Pharmacy Benefits Program 
 
Dept. of Health and Human Services 
Medicare Program: Medicare + Choice 
Prospective Payment System for Home Health Agencies 
Prospective Payment System and Consolidated Billing for Skilled Nursing Facilities 
Medicare Program: Hospital Inpatient Payments and Rates and Costs for Graduate Medical Education (1999) 
Medicare Program: Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems and Fiscal Year 2001 Rates 
Medicare Program: Revisions to Payment Policies Under the Physician Fee Schedule for Calendar Year 2001 
Medicare Program: Expanded Coverage for Outpatient Diabetes 
Prospective Payment System for Hospital Outpatient Services 
                                                 
77 Source: 2002 OMB Report at 59. 
Revision to Medicaid Upper Payment Limit Requirements for Inpatient Hospital Services 
Medicaid Program: Medicaid Managed Care 
Medicaid Program: Change in Application of Federal Financial Participation Limits 
Medicare Program: Inpatient Payments and Rates and Costs for Graduate Medical Education (2000) 
Medicare Program: Prospective Payment System and Consolidated Billing for Skilled Nursing Facilities - 
Update 
Medicare Program: Prospective Payment System for Inpatient Rehabilitation Hospital Services 
Medicare Program: Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems and Rates and Costs of 
Graduate Medical Education for Fiscal Year 2002 
Modification of the Medicaid Upper Payment Limit Transition Period for Hospitals, Nursing Facilities, and 
Clinic 
Services 
State Child Health; Implementing Regulations for the State Children’s Health Insurance Programs 
 
Social Security Administration 
Supplemental Security Income: Determining Disability for a Child Under Age 18 
Revised Medical Criteria for Determination of Disability, Musculoskeletal System and Related Criteria 
Collection of the Title XVI Cross-Program Recovery 
 
The Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight 
Risk-based Capital 
 
Department of Labor 
Government Contractors, Affirmative Action Requirements 
Claims for Compensation Under the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act 
Procedures for Predetermination of Wage Rates; Labor Standards Provisions Applicable to Contracts Covering 
Federally Financed and Assisted Construction and to Certain Nonconstruction Contracts (“Helpers”) 
Birth and Adoption Unemployment Compensation 
 
Dept. of Transportation 
Safety Incentive Grants for the Use of Seatbelts 
Amendment of Regulations Governing Railroad Rehabilitation and Improvement Financing Program 
 
Veterans Administration 
Disease Associated with Exposure to Certain Herbicide Agents: Type 2 diabetes 
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Federal Emergency Management Administration 
Supplemental Property Acquisition and Elevation Assistance 
Disaster Assistance: Cerro Grande Fire Assistance 
Supplemental Property Acquisition and Elevation Assistance 
 
Small Business Administration 
Small Business Size Standards: General Building Contractors, etc. 
New Market Venture Capital Program 
 
Office of Personnel Management 
Health Insurance Premium Conversion 
 
Federal Acquisition Regulation 
Electronic Commerce in Federal Procurement: FAR case 1997-304 
Electronic Commerce and Information Technology Accessibility: FAR case 1999-607 
 
Securities and Exchange Commission 
Disclosure of Mutual Fund After-Tax Returns 
Privacy of Consumer Financial Information 
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading 
Unlisted Trading Privileges 
Disclosure of Order Execution and Routing Practices 
Revision of the Commission’s Auditor Independence Requirements 
 
Federal Trade Commission 
Privacy of Consumer Financial Information 
 
Federal Communications Commission 
Promotion of Competitive Networks in Local Telecommunications Markets 
Competitive Bidding Procedures 
Installment Payment Financing for Personal Communications Services Licensees 
Assessment and Collection of Regulatory Fees for Fiscal Year 2000 
Narrowband Personal Communications Services; Competitive Bidding 
24 GHz. Service; Licensing and Operation 
Extending Wireless Telecommunications Services to Tribal Lands 
Assessment and Collection of Regulatory Fees for Fiscal Year 2001 
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Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
Revision of Fee Schedules; 100% Fee Recovery 
Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Models 
Revision of Fee Schedules; Fee Recovery for FY 2001 
 
Federal Reserve System 
Privacy of Consumer Financial Information 
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